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Williams 1 
The South was once a Democratic stronghold, but since the political shift of the 1960s, it 
has become almost a guarantee for Republican candidates in national elections. There is a long 
list of reasons for the solid red alignment of the South, but in recent years there has been a 
glimmer of hope across the region for Democratic candidates. In terms of economic policy, 
Democratic candidates can make a strong appeal to the blue collar and rural voters that make up 
much of the South. Additionally, several states have growing minority populations that in theory 
have a higher chance of identifying as Democrats. This, combined with growing urban 
populations, has taken several states in the South and turned them into potential swing states. It is 
believed to be a matter of increasing turnout among voters that are sympathetic to Democratic 
policies, which starts in the field.  
Over the last few election cycles, the Democratic party has transitioned from a national, 
top-down strategy to a grassroots one. It is possible that this strategy, if effective, can turn 
formerly red states into swing states, or blue states. The 2016 election cycle saw a 50-state 
strategy on the Democratic side, with an emphasis on several states in the South. Texas, Florida, 
South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia all received significant field funds and 
attention. The 2016 election was a strange one insofar as Donald Trump won the election, in 
spite of notoriously limited campaign infrastructure and a lack of ground game across the 
country. This was possibly due to a change election, or to the overall allure of outsider politics. 
Trump tapped into an angry and easily mobilized base, and won. As the experiment of the Trump 
presidency moves on, and future elections presumably move back to the political norm, however, 
the impact that field strategy has had for the past three election cycles will likely continue to 
grow. Though not all of these southern battleground states went blue in 2016, there is a chance 
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that the organizing approach taken by the Clinton campaign had a positive impact on turnout and 
vote choice in these southern battleground states. If that was the case, it is a strategy that, once 
built upon, could successfully tap into the voting population that have the capacity to turn these 
states purple, or even blue. This paper will analyze the impact of field office location in southern 
battleground on voter turnout and choice for the 2016 cycle.  
If the field offices were successful in their role, there will be three different results. First, 
the proximity to a field office variable will have a positive correlation with whether a survey 
respondent turned out to vote in the 2016 general election, holding constant all typical predictors 
of voting behavior. Second, field offices are the focal point of voter contact campaigns. 
Therefore, there will be a positive correlation between proximity to field offices and whether a 
voter was contacted directly by a campaign. This will also be subset into different methods of 
contact based on traditional success rates and necessity of local organizing.  Finally, whether or 
not there is a positive correlation between voting for Hillary Clinton and field office proximity 
among Democrats, and among Independent voters, will show if there is a positive voter 
persuasion impact from grassroots campaigning, rather than purely a turnout benefit. Essentially, 
grassroots campaigns are making a comeback with the intended goal of activating voters who are 
not guaranteed and consistent Democratic voters, and winning districts and states by doing so. 
These models will test the actual benefit of field campaigns in one of the most competitive 
regions in the country. 
 
Literature Review 
 
The literature surrounding voter mobilization as it applies to the South is limited, and 
thus the relevant literature is essentially divided between demographic analysis of the southern 
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electorate, and analysis of the impact of modern mobilization campaigns. The literature that 
contains a crossover of the two does so in a secondary capacity, and instead focuses on the 
impact specifically of minority mobilization, which is the key demographic case study in the 
South. Overall, the available literature specifically on voter mobilization in the South is limited, 
and concentrated largely on demographics. In order to determine any true correlation between 
Get Out The Vote campaigns and turnout, it is clearly necessary to use primary data from 
campaigns and secretaries of state. 
The cornerstone of Southern political studies is V. O. Key Jr.’s Southern Politics in State 
and Nation, which was first published in 1949. In looking for the context in which campaigns 
operate in the South, it is key to look first to Key’s work, and then to Black and Black’s Politics 
and Society in the South, which is a more modern addendum to Key’s work, published at the end 
of the Reagan administration. V. O. Key is necessary to understand the different manner in 
which politics is viewed in the South compared to the rest of the country. His book is broken into 
three sections: a brief history of the South, a set of chapters each dedicated to a different state, 
and the role of the party. Based on both Key’s analysis, and Black and Black’s updated analysis, 
the more local the party, the more effective of a political structure it is. The book also explains a 
political climate in which Democrats last controlled the South, though it was largely due to voter 
suppression. While this is less relevant over time, it is still telling of the structure and nature of 
southern politics, and of several issues that still plague southern campaigns. National parties 
have less of an impact than the local or county-level parties. Politics is highly personal, and 
historically speaking, southern voters were swayed most by party presence and quid pro quo. 
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The one commonality between all of the states V. O. Key, Jr. discusses is the importance 
of local politics. This is the primary basis for reintroducing field-based programs to the South in 
the recent campaign cycles. There are essentially two categories of states in the South, with two 
different bases for political structure. There are old guard states, primarily Virginia, South 
Carolina, Georgia, and others that have had established communities since essentially the 
founding of the country, and which have produced politically important families and individuals 
repeatedly over the decades. Virginia is the state where this is most the case, as it has a rich 
history at the center of national politics since the colonial years. In these states, there are deep 
rooted community traditions that build up to an established statewide political culture. Because 
of this culture, politicians tend to take a very individualized approach to campaigning, and appeal 
to each individual community’s unique characteristics. In this sense, field offices are a smart 
approach to localizing the rhetoric of a national campaign so as to appeal to voters in these states. 
That is perhaps why in Virginia and North Carolina, Hillary Clinton set up a field system that 
touched almost every county in the state. 
The second type of political culture V. O. Key explains is one based in the large, 
disconnected nature of some of the southern states that were later entries to the country. Florida 
and Texas are the best examples of this system. In both of these states, there was a lack of a 
strong central state government or party system, and as a result the main political unit became 
town and then county. While the lack of centrality is still the case in these states, it is now 
because they are so geographically large and diverse that the interests of voters differs greatly 
from one county to another. Both Texas and Florida have communities that feature heavily 
concentrated minority populations, as well as communities that are predominantly rural and 
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working-class whites. Additionally, there are several different urban centers in each, with their 
own unique interests. As a result, the best approach to appealing to voters in these states is not a 
top-down strategy, but a grassroots one focusing on specific communities. For example, in 
Florida the rhetoric that wins votes in Miami is going to be drastically different from what wins 
votes in Gainesville. Therefore, the field office approach is best to swinging a purple state like 
Florida or Texas blue. 
There are several different theories of race-based voting, as it impacts black and white 
communities in the South. Prior to Nixon’s Southern Strategy of racially coded campaign 
rhetoric, Democrats controlled the South, largely as a result of suppression of minority voters at 
the polls. V. O. Key Jr. put forward the most prominent theory of the impact of racial identity on 
voting behavior in his 1949 book. According to Key, white voters were increasingly likely to 
vote against minority interests in communities that were surrounded by dense black populations. 
This is the theory that the majority of literature studying post-Civil Rights southern politics tests. 
It is considered a theory of “black threat,” and has been most recently successfully applied to a 
case study on the 1990 Senate race by noted KKK Grand Wizard David Duke. Looking at the 
county level, Michael Giles and Melanie Butler regressed black population concentration on 
white turnout for the Duke campaign. The result is that Duke’s campaign, which ran on a 
platform of attacking welfare and affirmative action programs that were linked to black 
communities, received 44% of the total vote, but 60% of the white vote. While there were 
concerns over the lack of sufficient control variables, the authors found that for a ten percent 
increase in black concentration, there was a four percent higher chance that whites would vote 
for Duke, and a similar amount were more likely to register to vote and participate. The main 
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takeaway is that when it comes to the race in southern politics, diversity is a mobilizing force for 
many white communities, if it is for malicious reasons. 
In terms of the impact of race on modern presidential races, there is a lack of consensus 
over the implication of the election of Barack Obama. Statistically speaking, turnout for the 
Democrats was stable across white voters, with an increase in black voters. This is likely due at 
least in part to Claudine Gay’s theory of linked fate. The article “Southern Strategy 2.0: 
Conservatives, White Voters, and the Election of Barack Obama” by Thomas Edge lays out an 
analysis of the persistent gap between southern white voters and minority voters, even when 
presented with a black, progressive candidate. Turnout showed a 19% difference between white 
and black vote share in 2008. The authors contend that while it may appear promising for 
combatting the theory of black threat, it is likely an isolated incident due to the belief that Obama 
was a sign of a “post-racial” America. The result was a turn towards wolf-whistle politics by 
many southern whites, and the loss of several Obama-Coalition states in 2016. 
The paper “Racial Stereotypes, Racial Context, and the 2008 Presidential Election” puts 
the question of 2008 to the V. O. Key test. Using data from the Cooperative Congressional 
Election Survey and the American National Election Study, the authors measured voters’ racial 
prejudice based on three indicators, and regressed it on presidential vote choice with controls for 
partisanship, the ideology scale, gender, education, and income. The results were a negative link 
between racial context around voters and prejudice, and strong evidence that a voter’s evaluation 
of black work ethic was correlated to vote choice.  
It is common knowledge that the black vote and coalition-building are key to Democratic 
electoral success in the South, but the ability to reach and mobilize those voters is a challenge 
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that most southern Democrats have faced since the 1970s. The reason for electoral decline for 
Democrats after the 1970s was due to a major wave of partisan conversion in the 1990s 
according to J. Knuckey’s paper “Explaining Recent Changes in Partisan ID of Southern 
Whites.” By 2000, only a third of southern whites identified as Democrats, with most young 
voters registering as Republicans in a generational shift. Therefore, generational replacement 
combined with voter suppression in black communities, in Knuckey’s opinion, makes the South 
a difficult win for any Democrat. The proposed solution in this study is Democratic outreach 
concentrated on independent voters or moderate Republicans. While that would likely create a 
winning coalition, it is at odds with some of the other literature calling for voter outreach in 
black communities as a solution for historically low turnout for Democrats. 
The modern update to V. O. Key’s work is the 2016 installment of the series on southern 
electoral politics largely funded by the Citadel. In “The Future Ain’t What It Used to Be,” the 
authors reconstruct the state-by-state approach and methodology of “Southern Politics in State 
and Nation,” but focused on the 2016 election cycle. Knotts’ conclusion after looking 
comparatively in the campaigns in each state was that while the South is still a largely 
Republican stronghold, education, urbanization, and in-migration are driving a Democratic 
resurgence particularly in border states in the South. These states include Florida, North 
Carolina, Virginia, and Texas. In other words, states that are not associated with the deep south. 
Knotts cites an increase in potential Democratic voters who are not as heavily motivated as 
entrenched Republican voters from the South. In terms of electoral strategy, Knotts argues that 
those are the individuals that Democrats must mobilize before Republicans catch up. Therefore, 
an extensive field strategy in the South like the one Obama started, and Clinton continued, is 
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potentially the best step forward for Democratic electoral victory in newly battleground states in 
the South. 
There are two common beliefs when it comes to Get Out the Vote (GOTV) campaigns. 
First, face-to-face interactions with canvassers are most likely to mobilize voters. Second, the 
voters who are targeted, and eventually motivated to vote by these interactions, generally fall 
under the category of likely voters. It is much more difficult to motivate someone who does not 
have a history of voting to go to the polls simply through a targeted interaction. High propensity 
voters are generally more educated, engaged in their community, and in a higher income bracket. 
Voting probability is positively correlated with socioeconomic status, and is typically higher in 
white communities than minority communities . 1
Voter mobilization acts differently in regard to minority communities. The literature 
differs, especially in regard to black communities, as they have a different response to positive 
incremental change in socioeconomic conditions. Studies have shown that while it is true that 
regular voters are more common in wealthier black neighborhoods, the impact of mobilization 
efforts in those neighborhoods is not as strong as one would expect. Rather, there are higher 
success rates, at least during major elections, in lower socioeconomic brackets (Gay 2004). 
Claudine Gay attributes this to the relative prominence of a racial linked fate mentality among 
those in lower socioeconomic brackets. This sense atrophies as socioeconomic standing 
increases. According to Gay’s research, it is this mentality that allows for stronger voter 
mobilization in lower income minority communities, in spite of the overall lower reaction among 
black targeted voters compared to white targeted voters. 
1 Bedolla 2012 
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There are several methods of voter contact, but the most effective are those that have a 
personal interaction. This is typically phone banking and canvassing, though in recent election 
cycles text message organizing has become increasingly prominent. In a typical GOTV effort, 
canvassers are more effective than turning voters out than phone bankers . This is attributed to 2
the more personal nature of a face-to-face interaction versus a phone conversation. Furthermore, 
the impact of personal outreach changes depending on the election type. In municipal or off-year 
elections, high-propensity voters are the only ones statistically likely to respond to GOTV 
efforts. In presidential years, however, GOTV efforts have a positive effect on turning out 
low-propensity voters as well . Furthermore, there is a difference in relative impact of doors and 3
phones on minority targeted voters. Studies specifically targeted at minority communities have 
shown that while canvassers can be effective, phone bankers are more consistent at turning out 
voters . According to the authors of this study, canvass success is dependent on nonverbal cues 4
that are difficult to control for, and that low-propensity voters are more likely to respond to. They 
found that there are nonverbal cues that low-propensity voters may react negatively to, and that 
are difficult to control for. Therefore, in this case, canvassers and phone bankers had a similar 
success rate in turning out voters . 5
The source of mobilization strategy has evolved in the past decade, with campaigns 
moving further and further away from party alliance. While this may cause difficulty with access 
to voter data, it also allows candidates to build the coalitions they choose. Depending on the 
county, Richard Semiatin claims in “Voter Mobilization – Into the Future” that it can actually be 
2 ​Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009 
3  ​Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009 
4  ​Bedolla 2012 
5 ​ Ibid 
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risky politically to engage the black electorate and alienate some white moderates, while in other 
cases there are large enough black populations that it is a winning strategy. 
The importance of mobilization efforts also varies based on the author. While those who 
study mobilization techniques tend to believe that canvassing, followed by phone banking, are 
the most important parts of swaying voter choice. Those who focus on campaign rhetoric 
disagree, however. Tomz and Van Houwleing, in “Candidate Positioning and Voter Choice,” 
contend that the electorate is an intelligent and rational body that votes based on self-interest, and 
therefore is not easily swayed. While it is true that some communities are unlikely to respond to 
GOTV efforts, the literature of field studies has proven that they are effective, at least in 
mobilizing voters if not swaying their opinion.  
The primary unit of measurement for any form of voting behavior study in the South is 
the county. This is for two reasons: it is the smallest widely available unit for most necessary 
turnout, contact, and exit poll data; and, it is the best measurement of Southern community. 
Southern county operatives, based on the literature, play an arguably considerably more 
influential role as a collective body than their northern counterparts. In studies focusing on the 
impact of race, demographic data is drawn from the county level and the state level. This is the 
case in most studies re-evaluating the theory of black threat.  
In terms of studies dedicated to the impact of Get Out The Vote campaigns, there is a 
considerable amount of literature dedicated to randomized field experiments. The most 
comprehensive example of this is the book Mobilizing Inclusion: Transforming the Electorate 
Through GOTV Campaigns by Lisa Bedolla and Melissa Michelson. The authors test the 
common belief that the most successful GOTV campaigns are focused primarily on the doors, 
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and secondarily on the phones. In the authors’ sociocultural cognition model of voting behavior, 
they sought to determine which strategy was most effective in mobilizing each demographic 
population. The result was that while common knowledge generally holds true, there is great 
room for variation based on the volunteer’s demeanor, framing of the script, and length of 
conversation. The authors concluded, however, that it is difficult to conduct field studies to any 
high degree of certainty because it is impossible to control for nonverbal cues on the doors, and 
therefore impossible to determine exactly why conversation works best in changing voter 
behavior. The authors also stipulate that gaps in participation can be traced to declining 
mobilization efforts in certain communities, and that if this was reversed, minority votes could 
vastly alter election results, especially in southern states with strict voter ID laws.  
 
Methods 
 
Based on the increased emphasis on field organizing in the South, it is clear that there is an effort 
to turn southern swing states blue . The strategic placement of field offices shows where 6
Democratic campaigns believe they are most likely to flip districts, and to turn out voters. Most 
field offices have the capacity to turn out volunteers primarily in their county, and on weekends 
or days of action, to surrounding towns and counties as well. This traditional tier of organizing 
creates a primary contact zone, and a surrounding zone that is still touched but not as heavily. If 
the Democratic model of outreach is successful, areas with a field office should have higher 
turnout, and should be more likely to vote Democrat than counties that were not touched by 
6 ​Knotts, H. Gibbs. "Conclusion: The Long-Term Pitfalls of Trump’s Southern Strategy." In The Future Ain't What 
It Used to Be: The 2016 Presidential Election in the South, edited by Kapeluck Branwell DuBose and Buchanan 
Scott E., 249-60. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2018. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt201mpvp.18. 
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organizers. Given the swing state status of the states in question here, this should be especially 
true, as a disproportionate amount of resources was dedicated to the ground game in these states 
compared to the rest of the country. 
There has been a renewed emphasis on field operations since the 2008 election, in which 
President Obama’s electoral victory was largely credited to a resurgence in grassroots organizing
. The goal of extensive field campaigns is first to register voters, then to mobilize somewhat 7
likely and likely voters, and finally sway swing voters to choose your candidate. It is most 
common in down ballot races, but recent years have seen an increased emphasis in field and 
personal contacts for presidential campaigns on the Democratic side as well. In this election 
cycle, the Democrats had the clear advantage in terms of ground game. In many of the southern 
battlegrounds, Trump’s campaign had only one, if any, field offices, compared to several led by 
Clinton’s team. In North Carolina, one of the top three competitive states in the south, Clinton’s 
34 field offices considerably outpaced Trump’s 11. The same is true for Virginia, where 
Clinton’s campaign set up 27 offices independent from the coordinated campaign, and Trump’s 
team only set up 11 . This is indicative of a considerable difference in strategy, with Clinton’s 8
team focusing on the grassroots engagement that worked for Obama’s team in 2008 and 2012, 
and Trump’s team  focusing on a grasstops approach featuring larger events and media events as 
opposed to organizing at the local level. While Clinton lost the election, and some of the states 
studied here, these models will determine if the field operations her campaign ran had a positive 
impact on voters at the individual level. 
7 Masket, Seth E. "Did Obama's Ground Game Matter? The Influence of Local Field Offices during the 2008 
Presidential Election." The Public Opinion Quarterly 73, no. 5 (2009): 1023-039. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40467656. 
8
 ​Darr, Joshua. 2016. Where Clinton is setting up field offices – and where Trump isn't. ​538. 
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The states that studied here are southern swing states, or states where Democrats feel that 
there is potential to turn the state blue in an election. This is generally characterized by more than 
one campaign-specific field office, on top of the coordinated campaign offices that already exist 
due to the state party. In the 2016 cycle, that included Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Florida, Tennessee, and Texas. North Carolina, Virginia, and Florida are traditional battleground 
states in the last few cycles, as they have Democratic-leaning suburban and urban populations 
that are populous enough to compete with the rural and traditional conservative base. Tennessee, 
Texas, and South Carolina are new additions to this category, and though they are still southern 
battlegrounds, receive less funding than the former three as is evidenced by the considerably 
lower number of field offices. The addition of those three states as battlegrounds in 2016 
demonstrates the Democrats’ belief that there is potential to flip the South, or at least to mobilize 
a currently untapped base. These states have competitive districts for Democrats, and as such 
were targeted as flippable in 2016, unlike the rest of the South. As a result, there were substantial 
ground game operations in each. 
Each of the following models predicts the effect of the independent variable, county 
code, on various metrics of success for field office networks. The county code variable is coded 
on a scale of 0-2 for every county in these swing states. 2 means that that county has a field 
office in it, and therefore has the voters most likely to be contacted by a campaign. 1 means an 
adjacent county has a field office, and thus contains a voting universe that was likely touched by 
a campaign, though not on the same scale as those with a field office. 0 means that there is not an 
adjacent county or town with a field office. Typically, field offices are placed in the county 
where they will have the most impact, and concentrate their efforts there. Volunteers will also 
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branch out into neighboring turf on days of actions and for larger canvasses, so voters in adjacent 
counties are likely to be contacted, though not as frequently as those in a code 2 county. Finally, 
while those in counties coded 0 may receive some less targeted forms of contact, including 
mailers and television commercials, the contact is minimal. If the field offices are successful in 
achieving their purpose, there will be a strong correlation between the county code variable and 
respondent turnout in the 2016 election, and some correlation between county code and vote 
choice. 
The data for county code was drawn from records of Clinton’s field offices for the 2016 
cycle, and validated by checking local party records. For each field office, I paired it with the 
county it was in, and on a master list of all 693 counties across these six states coded those 
counties at level two. After identifying all of the level two counties for each state, I mapped it out 
on a county-level map of each state and identified counties that bordered ones with field offices. 
Following that process, the remaining were clearly level zero counties. Once the data was set, it 
was imported into Stata as a new variable paired with the county name variable that already 
existed in the CCES data. As a result, each respondent in these six states was paired with the 
appropriate code for the county that they lived in. 
The rationale behind the linear nature of the county code variable is based in typical 
Democratic grassroots strategy. The volunteer bases built up by organizers at each field office 
tend to focus first on the turf in the county in which they are located. This means almost daily 
phone banks and other outreach events, and typically a concentration of visible support for the 
candidate in these 2-code counties. The reasoning behind coding adjacent counties as “1” is 
heavily reliant on strategy as well. It is true that neighboring counties can often differ completely 
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in demographics and political leaning from the primary field office counties. However, voters in 
them are still likely to be touched, though in a less frequent and less targeted manner than voters 
in close proximity to a field office. This is because campaigns will often recruit less frequent 
volunteers for surges of activity, or weekends of action. On these days, volunteers go beyond 
their typical neighborhood turf and attempt to expand the reach of the campaign’s ground game. 
This typically includes outreach into neighboring turfs and counties. While it is more common in 
Democratic-leaning suburbs than rural ones where voters are farther apart, these weekends of 
action still target those areas. Thus, voters there are still likely to feel the impact of the 
campaign’s grassroots organization, just less frequently than those who live near a field office. 
Finally, voters in counties coded 0 are unlikely to be targeted voters, and are outside of the 
typical means of reach for organizers. Therefore, they are unlikely to be contacted in a 
substantial way beyond perhaps the occasional mailer or targeted social media post. 
There are three dependent variables that can be indicative of a successful field program. 
First, there is turnout, which is the most basic goal of grassroots organizing. This model will 
determine the impact proximity to a field office has on if a respondent voted. Second, there is 
vote choice, and the impact field campaigns had on vote choice among Democrats and 
non-Democrats. Finally, there are methods of contact. These models look at how successful field 
offices were at increasing voter contact across the primary mediums: canvassing, phone banking, 
mailers, and digital advertising. The independent variable of interest in all models was county 
code for field office presence. Additionally, the models for turnout and vote choice included 
standard control variables that tend to impact likelihood to vote.  For education, there is typically 
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an increased chance of voting as an individual’s level of education increases . Household income 9
also has a positive correlation with chance of voting . Finally, statistically race plays a role in 10
determining probability of turnout, as there are higher turnout rates among white voters than 
minority voters .  These models measure how effective field offices were in all important 11
aspects of a field-based campaign: turnout, contact, and swaying vote choice. 
The data for the dependent variables is drawn from the Cooperative Congressional 
Election Survey, and is based on the respondents in the six states studied. The survey is 
self-reported, and includes responses for voting in the past two elections, candidate choice, and 
party identification. It allows for an analysis that field offices had not just on county level 
turnout, but on individuals and their voting behavior and choice. The potential problem it poses 
is misrepresentation of turnout or vote choice, or human error in memory of voter contact, but 
overall it is the best means by which to study the impact of proximity to field office. 
Additionally, following the 2016 cycle the CCES used a method of vote validation, which allows 
for greater confidence in the analysis. 
For the voter turnout model, which is perhaps most indicative of the success of the field 
office-style operation, the dependant variable was voter turnout in 2016, which measures 
respondents’ turnout to the polls in the 2016 general election. In addition to the independent 
variable of county code, the typical indicators that influence an individual’s chance of voting 
were included. These control variables are education, race, and family income.  Additionally, the 
variable for turnout in 2012 is included as a control, as in theory field offices should motivate 
9 ​Milligan, Kevin S, Enrico Moretti, and Philip Oreopoulos. "Does Education Improve Citizenship? Evidence from 
the U.S. and the U.K." 2003. 
10 ​Silberman, Jonathan, and Garey Durden. "The Rational Behavior Theory of Voter Participation: The Evidence 
from Congressional Elections." Public Choice 23 (1975): 101-08. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30022833. 
11Ibid 
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irregular voters to the polls, not just people who vote in every election. The goal is to turnout 
more voters and motivate the party’s base, and voter turnout in 2012 helps control for that . 12
The model for candidate choice is based on a dummy variable for vote choice. The 
variable measures if someone voted for or against Hillary Clinton, as presumably the impact a 
Democratic field office in the general election would have is on a voter’s choice of the 
Democratic nominee. The dummy variable is the dependent variable, VoteChoice. The controls 
for vote choice are similar to the ones for turnout in that they are typical predictors of someone 
voting. In addition to the normal controls, the Democrat dummy variable is an independent 
variable, as the interaction variable between Democrat and county code. The interaction variable 
will determine the impact the field office presence had on Democrats in those counties, relative 
to Republicans and Independents. This model will likely produce a positive and significant 
probability of respondents voting for Hillary Clinton, and while party affiliation will likely drive 
that the most, there should be some correlation with the ground game variable. 
For the voter contact models, the CCES measured four different methods: contact 
through canvassing, contact through mailers, contact through phone calls, and contact online. 
After modeling the impact proximity to a field office had on each of these individually, there is 
an aggregate variable that represents if voters were contacted at all. The control variables are 
Democrat identification and if the respondent voted in 2012. Typically, volunteers will target 
individuals who are irregular voters to regular voters, and who have demonstrated some level of 
interest in the Democratic party. These controls will help show that these field offices had an 
impact on their targeted audience. If the field offices were doing their jobs, the most significant 
12 Bedolla LG, Michelson MR. 2012. Mobilizing Inclusion: Transforming the Electorate Through Get-Out-the-Vote 
Campaigns. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press 
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impact would be on in-person interactions, followed by phone contact, and finally mail and 
digital contact. This variable judges the extent to which field offices are successful in their 
contact methods. The primary role of a field office is to contact voters, and the secondary role is 
to achieve the goal of increasing turnout or swaying votes, depending on the district. Even if the 
office is not successful in winning votes or registering voters in a particular county, the best way 
of determining that it was actively contributing to the campaign is through measures of voter 
contact. In the CCES survey, not all respondents answered the questions about various methods 
of voter contact, so the number of observations is considerably less than that for other models. 
However, this is a crucial model in determining success of the grassroots method, as if there is 
not evidence of voter contact, it would be entirely possible that any correlation with turnout or 
vote choice was pure coincidence due to the placement of offices in Democrat-friendly areas. 
 
Results 
 
Turnout: 
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The model for turnout, which is the most significant in gauging the impact a field office has, 
shows a significant positive impact on a voter’s decision to vote in the general election. The 
primary job of field operations is to register and mobilize voters from their base. Following that 
logic, the turnout should be highest in the counties that have field offices. That proved to be true 
in this case. The model measuring the impact of field office presence on voter turnout was 
entirely statistically significant. The strongest predictor of voting was unsurprisingly if the 
respondent voted in 2012. The margins show a 2% increase in predicted probability of voting 
based on each increase in the scale on county code among those who voted in 2012, though the 
overall likelihood of voting is high at 97%. For predicted probability models, there are two 
important categories: turnout among those who voted in 2012, and turnout among those who did 
not vote, and therefore are potential targets for 2016 organizers. The impact on those who did not 
vote in 2012 should be most significant. 
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Each independent variable in the turnout model is important to consider. While county 
code was positively correlated with increased probability of voting, it is not the strongest 
predictor. Education was positively correlated with voter turnout in 2016 and statistically 
significant, so clearly level of education attained is still an important indicator of voting behavior 
regardless of the field operation. Family income, in regards to the relationship between voter 
turnout and proximity to a field office, has a very minimal positive effect. Compared to the other 
variables, income is largely irrelevant to voting behavior. Race, as a control variable, has an 
interesting but slight negative correlation to turnout. As “white” is coded lowest on that scale, it 
shows that minority voters are less likely to turnout than white voters. However, the difference is 
very slight. When running models for predicted probability, race cannot be held at its means as 
other variables can as it is categorical, so models are present controlling for white voters and for 
black voters, the two largest demographics in southern respondents by a considerable amount. 
Beyond traditional demographic variables, the control variables that monitor prior voting 
behavior are important to consider, as they have the largest impact on voting behavior in the 
2016 election. Unsurprisingly, whether the respondent voted in 2012 had the highest impact on 
probability of voting in 2016. The correlation in the logit regression is clearly the strongest 
between voter turnout and 2012 and 2016 compared to all other variables. This accounts for the 
voters who are least impacted by field office presence, as it is uncommon that consistent voters 
are the targets of campaign grassroots outreach. 
Prior voting behavior aside, the impact of party affiliation on turnout is surprisingly 
strong. Identifying as a registered Democrat had a not insignificant positive correlation to voting 
in 2016. The model demonstrates that identifying as a Democrat is positively correlated to voter 
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turnout, and thus Democrats are more likely to vote than Republicans and Independents. In the 
predicted probability model for this relationship, Democrats were even more positively 
correlated with voting. In spite of this correlation, the interaction variable between Democratic 
identification and county code, has a negative correlation with the turnout. When modeled in a 
graph, however, it is clear at each degree of proximity to a field office, Democrats are more 
likely to have voted in 2016 than their non-Democratic counterparts, so the slightly negative 
correlation with the interaction variable is more likely an indicator of the nature of southern 
battleground states than the impact of field organizing on voters. This could mean a number of 
things about the role field offices play. On the positive side, it could just be representative of the 
nature of several of the counties featuring Democratic field offices. In southern battlegrounds, 
few counties are truly Democratic strongholds. Therefore, several of the offices could be placed 
based on areas with low registration or historically low turnout for Democrats, with the goal of 
turning out a higher percentage in the 2016 cycle. If that is the case, then it would make sense 
that Democratic counties with field offices have populations that are inherently less likely to 
vote. Given the fairly low correlation coefficient for Democrat and county interaction variable, it 
is not a particularly consequential part of the model, especially compared to county code, but it is 
interesting to note as it may be the result of strategic office locations. The less positive 
possibility is that field offices actually do not have a substantial impact on their base, and instead 
manage to somehow reduce odds of turnout. Given the substantial correlation with county code 
and Democrats, however, this is the least likely result. Instead, it is likely a result of placing field 
offices in swing districts. 
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For voters who voted in 2012, both in models controlling for black voters and white 
voters, there is a high predicted probability of voting even in areas nowhere near a field office. 
The change in predicted probability from counties coded 0 to those coded 2 was 2% for both 
black and white voters. This is not surprising considering that voter turnout in 2012 was by far 
the most substantial variable in determining turnout in 2016. 
The secondary model, which shows the impact of field office location on the predicted 
probability of respondents who did not vote in 2012 of turning out to the polls in 2016, is the best 
predictor overall of success of the field office model. Among white voters who did not vote in 
the 2016 general election, the predicted probability of voting in counties coded 0 is only 67.7%. 
This increases to 73% in counties coded 1, and finally to 78.4% in counties that have a field 
office. Based on this model, field offices have the potential to increase predicted probability of 
voting by 11% in nonvoters. In the same model controlling for black voters, there was a similar 
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11% change from counties coded 0 to counties coded 2, with the predicted probability for black 
non-voters in counties with a field office being 77.3%. This substantial increase in probability of 
voting in irregular voters based off of proximity to an office shows strong correlation in terms of 
voter turnout. In this case, there is also a strong case to be made for causality, as something 
clearly motivated respondents who did not vote in 2012 to do so in 2016, and the increase is 
directly related to field office location. Therefore, in the southern battleground states, the 
grassroots organizing network for the Clinton campaign was clearly successful in fulfilling its 
goal of mobilizing irregular voters and potential Democrats. 
This model of voter turnout compared to field office location lends itself to proving the 
success of field offices in achieving their primary goal of driving voters to the polls. Given that 
in counties with field offices there was a substantial and statistically significant probability that 
voters would turn out to the polls, it is possible that this was driven by the field offices. This does 
not prove causality, however. In several cases, field offices are set up in Democratic strongholds 
to mobilize the base. For example, in North Carolina there is a concentration of field offices 
around the research triangle, and less in the more rural parts of the state. That could account for 
the increased probability that respondents in those counties who identify as Democrats voted. It 
is entirely likely that the areas coincide with higher Democratic turnout, and the field office 
location was a response to that instead of the other way around. Despite this possibility, there is a 
strong correlation between office location and voter turnout among those identifying as 
Democrats. Furthermore, historically speaking high turnout has a tendency of benefitting 
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Democratic candidates . Thus the model of field organizing in Southern battlegrounds appears 13
to be effective in achieving its goal. 
 
Vote Choice: 
 
Vote choice is perhaps the least indicative of success for a field operation in a 
battleground state, as it is based on many factors other than simply if a voter was contacted by a 
local campaign organizer. The best way to study the potential impact of a field operation on vote 
choice in a county would likely be a study of poll numbers before and after the implementation 
of the field program. However, a rough estimate of how impactful a field campaign was on 
winning hearts and minds is also important in analyzing the overall success of the grassroots 
campaign strategy. In this model, there is a logistic regression between the county code 
13 ​Hansford, Thomas G., and Brad T, Gomez. "Estimating the Electoral Effects of Voter Turnout." ​The 
American Political Science Review​ 104, no. 2 (2010): 268-88. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40863720. 
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independent variable and the VoteChoice dependent variable, controlling for typical predictors of 
voting behavior, as well as party and the Democrat and county interaction variable. The results 
are statistically significant, and show a strong correlation between field office location and the 
choice to vote for Clinton. 
The model showing the impact on vote choice shows that each increase in county code 
creates an 17% increase in the predicted probability that the respondent voted for Clinton in 
2016. This is a considerable effect, and is likely somewhat derived from field activity in the 
county given the strong correlation and difference with each increase in field office proximity. 
The control variables used were the same as those used in the turnout model to account for 
typical predictors of voting behavior. Family income, like in turnout, showed minimal positive 
correlation. The variable for education accounted for a greater probability of voting for Clinton 
than even county codes, which maintains the theory that increases in education often correlate 
with more liberal political beliefs. Finally, under demographic variables, race had a slightly 
weaker correlation than county code, though it was still significant. Minority voters, based on 
this model, are more likely to vote for Clinton, likely because there is a higher chance that they 
are registered Democrats. 
The surprising result is the statistically significant negative correlation with the 
interaction variable for Democrats in this county. In keeping with the hypothesis, there should be 
a positive interaction here. However, there are a few potential explanations. First, voter 
persuasion efforts are unlikely to target those strongly identifying as Democrats. Instead, they 
focus on undecided voters and moderates. In that case, there should be little to no interaction 
with the Democrats in these counties. Additionally, it could represent the fracture within the 
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Democratic party left by a drawn out primary. Strong Democrats may respond negatively to a 
constant influx of information about Clinton, thus explaining the negative correlation. More 
likely than not, however, this is just a product of the lack of use voter persuasion has on the party 
base. 
 Unsurprisingly, the strongest predictor overall for a vote for Clinton was party 
identification. Registered Democrats were far more likely to vote for Clinton. Identifying as a 
registered Democrat equated to the most considerable increase in probability of voting for 
Clinton, but once again the interaction variable between the Democrat dummy variable and 
county code variable returned a negative correlation to voter choice of Hillary Clinton. 
Furthermore, the correlation was stronger than the positive correlation between county code and 
vote choice. Therefore, it is unlikely that, at least among the Democratic base of many of the 
counties in southern battlegrounds, field offices are likely to sway vote choice considerably. The 
lack of positive correlation with the interaction variable for Democrats in these counties is 
especially strong proof of that. 
When looking at predicted probabilities for voting for Clinton, there are two key models 
to look at as a means of judging the impact of field offices. First, there is the calculated marginal 
effects for the logit model, controlling for voters who are Democrats. Because race is not a 
continuous variable, it is also held constant at 1 for white, as 71% of CCES respondents were 
white, and 74% of CCES respondents in the states observed for this study were white; in a 
secondary model, it is also held constant for black respondents, coded 2.  
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The first model shows a moderate increase in predicted probability of voting for Hillary 
Clinton based on field office proximity. In areas with no field office, there is an 87% chance of 
white Democrats voting for Hillary. This increases to 89% in counties coded 1, and 91% in 
counties that have offices. For the same model, but with black Democrats, there was a similar 
3% point increase in predicted probability from counties coded 0 to counties coded 1. This is 
unsurprising given that being registered as a Democrat was by far the strongest predictor for 
voting for Hillary. The above models only represent a marginal benefit to consistent Democratic 
voters of having a field office nearby, and once again this small difference may be explained by 
the placement of offices in counties at least somewhat sympathetic to Democratic candidates. 
The second part of the graph has the same controls for race, but this time Democrat is 
held at 0, meaning that the predicted probability outputs are for registered Republicans or 
Independents. This model is especially useful to look at for vote choice, as it will show the 
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impact grassroots organizing has outside of the party in states that are only recently swinging 
back towards the liberal side of the spectrum. For white non-Democrats, there is unsurprisingly a 
low chance of voting for Clinton, though it increases considerably as proximity to a field office 
increases. The predicted probability of voting for Clinton among white non-Democrats in areas 
far from a field office is only 15%. For the same demographic in counties with a field office, the 
predicted probability is 21%. Therefore, there is a not insignificant effect from field offices on 
vote choice among non-Democrats. For black non-Democrats, the change in predicted 
probability of voting for Clinton is similar to that in white non-Democrats. Though the predicted 
probability was low, it ranged from 16% in counties coded 0, to 21% in counties coded 2. This 
may be a result of targeting methods by the field operatives who saw an opportunity to recruit 
minority voters based on Trump’s rhetoric, or simply because they were identified as a 
potentially recruitable group. Either way, a 5% increase in predicted probability of voting for 
Clinton is a positive marker of success for the field office system. 
Overall, there is no clear causality behind the relationship between vote choice and field 
office presence. It is possible that the increased odds of turnout for Clinton were the result of 
increased field contact and presence in a voter’s area. It could also be a false positive, however. 
Given that the strongest predictor for a Clinton voter was party registration, it is likely that the 
campaign took advantage of that known quantity in planning its ground game, and opted to focus 
on turnout more so than winning new votes. If that was the case, the party likely would have 
placed offices in counties that are more heavily liberal, and with higher rates of registered 
Democrats. Such a strategy would enable the campaign to activate Democrats who may have 
been unlikely to vote, in which case field office location did not drive increased likelihood of 
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Clinton voters in an area, but rather registered Democrats and Clinton-friendly turf drove field 
office location. Therefore, while there is a strong relationship between Democratic voters and 
Democratic field offices, and that is a positive for the structure and success of a grassroots 
program, it is not enough to determine causality or the success of a grassroots program on not 
only registering and mobilizing voters, but winning more votes for their candidate. 
 
Voter Contact: 
The models for various contact forms show a range of impact from field office presence. 
Field offices generally focus on person-to-person contact primarily. The purpose of grassroots 
strategy is to hire organizers that then work to build a volunteer base, which in turn reaches out 
to the targeted voting population to drive turnout and vote choice through personal interactions. 
As the literature has shown, personal interactions are the most successful in driving voting 
behavior. Because field offices are so heavily based in personal interactions, the highest impact 
will likely be on canvassing contacts and phone bank contacts. Mail and digital outreach has a 
far larger capacity for voter contact, and as such is unlikely to change much in the presence of a 
field office for the Clinton campaign. The following models measure the impact of field office 
presence on each form of voter contact, and on the overall profile of if a voter was contacted by a 
candidate or campaign. 
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The first model looks at the impact on mail contacts. The predicted probability for 
contact by mail increases approximately 7% with the presence of a field office in a respondent’s 
county. There is a considerable increase in the margins, however, as county code increases. 
There is a 3% increase in probability that a voter was contacted by a campaign through the mail 
when the scale moves from no nearby field office to respondents in counties adjacent to field 
offices. There is also an increase when respondents move from counties adjacent to field offices 
to counties with field offices in them. Clearly, though mail is not a commonly used method of 
voter contact anymore, and is not reliant on proximity to a field office, there is a slim and 
statistically significant relationship between field office presence and voter contact through mail. 
Overall, mailers are not the most effective means of campaigning currently, and as such digital 
has slowly taken over the role that mailed literature once played for campaigns. While the 
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probability for mail contact reached its maximum at 56%, that is 7% more likely than in areas 
without field offices, so campaigns managed to increase voter contact through all channels by 
using a grassroots system. If even the mail program was more successful in contacting voters 
when close to a field office, it is a sign of success for the grassroots goal of increasing voter 
contact in swing states. 
 
The second model looks at digital contact and its relation to field office location. Digital 
contact the weakest correlation to field offices, as it is not at all reliant on geographic location. 
Most digital operations are run out of campaign headquarters or state headquarters, and therefore 
county level organizing is not expected to impact strategy too much. Social media is accessible 
regardless of county lines, and that is accurately represented in this model. The correlation 
coefficient for county code was only 0.014, and more importantly has the highest P-value of any 
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method of contact. The P-value is well beyond the limit of statistical significance at 0.655, and 
therefore there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Clearly, digital contact 
remains true to its nature and is not impacted by grassroots campaigns.  
The lack of impact field office presence has on digital contacts is a positive for the 
hypothesis that field offices have a substantial impact, as it acts as a placebo test for other forms 
of contact. Based off of the structure of most digital programs, they are run at a very high level, 
and are not dependent upon field presence. Therefore, if there was a correlation between digital 
outreach and field office location, it would signal that there was another variable at play in all of 
the voter contact models. The lack of an interaction proves that the impact field offices had on 
other forms of contact was substantial. 
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The third model looks at the impact of the county code variable on probability that 
respondents were contacted by campaigns through phone banks or recorded phone calls. This 
strategy is likely to be partially strengthened by proximity to field office, though not to the same 
extent as canvass interactions.  This is because it is not necessary for those contacted over the 
phone to reside in the same area as the organizer or volunteer calling them, as there is 
increasingly an emphasis on online phone banks, and statewide or even nationwide phone banks 
coordinated online. The result is eager volunteers contacting individuals from different counties 
and communities. At its core, however, phone banking is still a largely local and personalized 
strategy built on organizers and volunteers reaching out to their neighbors and nearby towns. 
Because this is the core of organizing, and has larger capacity for voters contacted than 
canvassing does, it is expected to have a reasonably high correlation to field office location, and 
to be statistically significant. 
The overall correlation coefficient is not especially high at 0.1, but it is statistically 
significant. More importantly, the models predicted using margins show two important things. 
First, there is a reasonable increase in probability of a respondent receiving a campaign call from 
no proximity to a field office to immediate proximity to a field office. This confirms that in the 
realm of organizing, phone banking is still community-based, at least to a degree. Second, the 
model shows that there is around a 71-75% probability that a respondent was contacted by a 
campaign call. This is promising for the success of field operations, especially given the nature 
of the states these models were run on. For the probability to be that high in states like Texas, 
South Carolina, and Virginia it is clear that there is a substantial benefit to maintaining an 
elaborate field organization at the county-to-county level, as the Clinton campaign did in 2016. 
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The next tier of voter contact is personal contact, which as the literature has shown, is the 
most effective means of winning votes and convincing voters to turn out to the polls . A 14
one-on-one interaction at the door through canvassing is the tried and true method of grassroots 
politics. While it is harder to employ at the national level, in theory field offices would create 
organizing hubs where canvasses would be easily launched. The model shows, however, that in 
the states studied, there is no correlation between personal contact and proximity to field office. 
The correlation coefficient is negligible, at -0.001, and has a P-value of 0.981. Therefore, it is 
statistically insignificant and not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. The lack of 
impact field office location seems to have on personal contact, when in theory it should only 
14 ​ Bedolla 2012 
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increase personal interaction-based organizing, is surprising. The most likely explanation for this 
discrepancy is that a presidential campaign, even when emphasizing grassroots engagement, 
operates at a more macro level than would allow it the capacity to emphasize doors knocked. 
Additionally, the campaign may focus on other, far-reaching methods of contacting voters, and 
instead leave canvassing to local Democratic campaigns. When a campaign lacks the capacity to 
conduct a large-scale canvass effort, it will frequently “drop lit” and have another campaign hand 
out their materials on the doors. The Clinton campaign may have done that, or they may have 
focused primarily on phone-based contact. When looking at the crosstab of CountyCode and 
personal contact, it shows that only 379 respondents surveyed had been contacted in person by a 
campaign. Therefore, it seems that field office proximity is irrelevant in this case, as canvassing 
was not a particularly notable technique employed by the Clinton team in southern battlegrounds. 
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Finally for voter contact is the aggregate variable measuring any form of campaign 
contact that respondents received during the 2016 election cycle. While the subcategories of 
contact are important insofar as they provide insight into the strategic role that field offices play 
in presidential grassroots strategy, the aggregate variable provides a topline means of analyzing 
the overall impact of field offices on fulfilling their purpose of connecting with voters. In this 
model, it is substantially impactful, and statistically significant, in increasing the probability that 
voters were contacted by a campaign in 2016. 
The margins prediction for overall voter contact does show a slightly less expansive 
reach for voter contact. At the highest level of proximity to a campaign office, the predicted 
probability of a respondent being contacted by a campaign is only 62%. However, that is a 
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substantial increase over the 50% predicted probability of contact for respondents in counties 
without a nearby field office. Therefore, there is a clear benefit to having a widespread net of 
field offices in battleground states. Even if voter contact is not at an especially high level, there is 
a strong correlation between contact and field office presence. In order to further engage with 
communities in southern battlegrounds, and in doing so win votes, Democrats need to appeal to 
voters. The demonstrated increase in that appeal through the grassroots network is undeniable. 
That network enables the campaign to contact a wider variety of voters, and based on the 
predicted probabilities above, to do so successfully. Therefore, it is a strong technique in the 
Democrats’ strategy to turn the South blue. 
Overall, the voter contact models are telling of partial success for grassroots campaigns in 
the South. While there was no impact on person-to-person contacts, which are typically the most 
persuasive, there is an overall strong relationship between voter contact and field office locations 
in the southern battleground states. The overall increase in predicted probability of voter contact 
shows that even if grassroots outreach is not at the ideal level that it may be in other blue states, 
it increases substantially with the presence of field offices and campaign organizers. Therefore, 
the Clinton campaign demonstrated progress in flipping counties and states in the South through 
its increased rates of voter contact. 
 
Conclusion 
What these models show is the potential for Democrats to make electoral gains in the 
South through a continued and expanding grassroots strategy. If one campaign had the ability to 
turn out nonvoters through a network of grassroots offices and operatives that did not span the 
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entire state, it is a promising sign for the potential of grassroots organizing at a larger scale in 
future elections. The dramatic increase in predicted probability of voter contact, and in turnout 
among nonvoters, in counties with field offices present clearly demonstrates the success of the 
Clinton campaign in mobilizing voters in 2016. As the literature showed, turnout is one of the 
primary problems facing Democrats in the South. By expanding ground game beyond the 
traditional battlegrounds of Virginia and Florida, the Clinton campaign was able to mobilize 
more voters, and if Democrats continue with the upward momentum that her grassroots strategy 
built upon, it is possible that in future presidential elections the Democratic base in the South 
will be active enough to turn even more districts and states into battlegrounds. 
The models above are not definitive in their explanation of the impact of field offices in 
the 2016 election. Certainly, the election was decided by something beyond field offices, and 
therefore their impact was not as substantial as the Clinton campaign likely anticipated. The 
results were still positive in terms of turning out previously unmotivated voters. This trend will 
likely continue, especially among the Democratic base, in 2020 as the “Resistance” opposition to 
Trump’s presidency continues. Since the 2016 election, grassroots organizing has become a 
staple of the Democratic Party, both for campaigns and separate from them. This increase in 
activism and outreach will likely result in a more substantial field operation in 2020, though 
perhaps with a less significant impact. 
In order to truly determine the impact field offices had in the South, future studies would 
do best to look not just at previous turnout data, but previous field office location. It also would 
help to look at a comparative analysis across the 2012, 2016, and 2020 elections to gauge impact 
in three very different political climates. Additionally, looking at each of the six states used as 
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individual case studies in addition to the aggregate models above would allow for a greater 
comparison on ground game impact, especially between states like North Carolina and Texas, 
which had a great disparity in number of field offices per capita for Democrats. Finally, it would 
be useful to look at a comparison of Republican and Democratic ground game. The turnout 
model, for example, took into account all voters in the states used. That means that Republicans 
who were not the targets of Democratic outreach were included as well. Dividing the data 
between Republicans and Democrats, and gauging the impact of the limited Republican ground 
game compared to the far more extensive Democratic ground game would help to measure the 
overall impact of field operations on the party’s base, which is of course the targeted group. 
Overall, there is no definitive way to prove impact of a field operation, especially in an 
election where the side that relied on it lost several of the states in question. Given the precedent 
of impactful grassroots campaigns, and the renewed emphasis on grassroots since the 2016 
election, it is worth studying the impact of the field office model. Though it may not have won 
the South for Democrats in 2016, it undeniably led to increased turnout in parts of the 
Democratic base, and thus may be a plausible method for making further electoral gains up and 
down the ballot in future elections. 
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